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The ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and Its Future in the United States
By Steve Charnovitz*

Freedom of association is a bedrock principle of international labor law. In 1919
the Allied powers expressed “recognition of the principle of freedom of association” in
part XIII (Labour) of the Treaty of Versailles, which became the Constitution of the
International Labour Organization (ILO).1 Nearly three decades later, in 1948, the ILO
adopted the landmark Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organize (No. 87).2 Article 2 of C. 87 declares: “Workers and employers,
without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the

*

Published in Vol. 102 of the American Journal of International Law, 2008.

The author thanks Charles Craver, Janelle Diller, Ronnie Goldberg, Abraham Katz,
Francis Maupain, and Anne Trebilcock for their helpful comments.
1

Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), pt. XIII, pmbl., June 28, 1919, 2
Bevans 43; see also id., Art. 427 (General Principles) (including “[t]he right of
association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers”). The
current ILO Constitution includes the original preambular provision but omits the
provision in Article 427, which was replaced with revised general principles in the ILO
Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944. That declaration reaffirms that “freedom of
expression and of association are essential to sustained progress.” ILO Const., annex,
para. 1(b), available at <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm>. In 1948 the U.S.
Congress authorized the United States to accept the revised ILO Constitution, which
includes the Declaration of Philadelphia. Act of June 30, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-843, 62
Stat. 1151.

2

Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise (No. 87), July 9, 1948, 68 UNTS 17 [hereinafter C. 87]. Several months later, in
December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which contains provisions regarding freedom of association and the right to join
(or not join) labor unions. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III),
Arts. 20(1), 23(4), UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). For background on C. 87, see Harold
Dunning, The Origins of Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to
Organize, 137 INT’L LAB. REV. 149 (1998).

rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without
previous authorisation.”3
Although the U.S. government voted in the ILO for the adoption of C. 87, the
United States has not ratified it.4 President Harry S. Truman recognized the importance of
C. 87 by transmitting it to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent in 1949.5 The
transmittal included a letter from Secretary of State Dean Acheson expressing the
coordinated views of interested agencies and departments of the U.S. government that
“the subject matter of the convention is appropriate under our constitutional system for
Federal action” under Article 19(7)(a)6 of the ILO Constitution.7 In addition, Acheson’s
letter expressed the administration’s view that “no new Federal legislation or revision of
existing Federal law is necessary to effect compliance by the United States with the terms

3

C. 87, supra note 2, Art. 2.

4

The Convention was adopted by 127-0 (with 11 abstentions) at the ILO Conference
held in San Francisco. The U.S. government, worker, and employer delegates voted for
the Convention. INT’L LAB. CONF., RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, 31st Sess. 268 (1948).

5

Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention (No. 87)
Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, S. EXEC.
DOC. NO. 81–S (1949).
6

Letter from the Secretary of State to the President (Aug. 26, 1949), reprinted in id. at 2,

2.
7

Article 19(7)(a) states:
In the case of a federal State, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) in respect of Conventions and Recommendations which the federal
government regards as appropriate under its constitutional system for federal
action, the obligations of the federal State shall be the same as those of Members
which are not federal States.
ILO Const., supra note 1, Art. 19(7)(a). Article 19(7) contains sophisticated provisions
governing the obligations of federal states.

of the convention.”8 This position was based on the assumption that freedom of
association is protected by the U.S. Constitution and that any inconsistent federal or state
law would be unconstitutional.9
Nearly sixty years later, C. 87 continues to lie on the shelf in the Senate. It is the
longest-pending treaty on the calendar of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.10
Despite its substantive and symbolic importance, the Convention on Freedom of
Association has become the untouchable treaty in American politics.

I. THE ILO AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Within the ILO, C. 87 has grown in importance and gained wide acceptance. As
of December 2007, 148 states had ratified C. 87, equal to 82 percent of the ILO’s
membership.11 Of those ratifications, 28 came about within the past decade. In one
somewhat ironic episode, Indonesia ratified C. 87 in 1998 after being urged to do so by
the U.S. government and the International Monetary Fund.12

8

Letter from the Secretary of State to the President, supra note 6, at 2.

9

See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Briefing Paper on ILO Convention 87 Concerning Freedom of
Association (Oct. 1980), reprinted in The United States and the International Labor
Organization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong.
49, 52 (1985).

10

U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Treaties Pending in the Senate
(Updated as of July 13, 2007), available at <http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending>.
The next two oldest treaties are ILO conventions transmitted in 1962 and 1966.

11

The United States is not alone in failing to join C. 87. Fully 33 ILO member countries
have not ratified it, including, for example, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Brazil, China, India,
Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand.
12
Prepared Statement of Timothy Geithner, Treasury Under Secretary, Before the
Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations (Feb. 16, 2000),

The Convention on Freedom of Association enjoys a special status within the
ILO. In 1951 the ILO Governing Body established the tripartite13 Committee on Freedom
of Association (CFA), mandated to examine complaints about violations of the
associational rights of a labor union. A complaint may be filed against a government by
another government or by qualified organizations of workers or employers. Besides C.
87, the CFA also supervises implementation of the core ILO Convention Concerning the
Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively (No. 98).14 The CFA has long been lauded for
its contribution to human and labor union rights, and benefited for over three decades
from the leadership of Judge Roberto Ago.15 The committee has examined over 2600
cases.
The CFA may hear a complaint about a government’s violation of freedom of
association regardless of whether the accused government is party to C. 87. Indeed, the
CFA has considered 49 cases against the United States. The inclusive terms of reference

available in LEXIS, U.S. Congress Library, Fed. News Serv. File; see also 19 U.S.C.
§262p-4p (2000) (calling on the secretary of the treasury to urge international financial
institutions to encourage borrowing countries to use relevant ILO conventions in taking
action to guarantee internationally recognized worker rights).
13

The ILO is organized on the tripartite principle of representation of each member state
by two government delegates, one worker delegate, and one employer delegate.
14

Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and
Bargain Collectively (No. 98), July 1, 1949, 96 UNTS 257. In a nutshell, C. 98 aims at
protecting workers vis-à-vis employers, while C. 87 aims at protecting workers vis-à-vis
governments. HÉCTOR BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ, GERALDO VON POTOBSKY, & LEE
SWEPSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS SYSTEM AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS 171 (1996). The ILO conventions
referred to in this Editorial are available online at
<http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/langen/index.htm>.
15

Nicolas Valticos, Roberto Ago (1907–1995), 89 AJIL 581, 583 (1995).

for the CFA were agreed to because of the fundamental nature of the right of
association.16 Thus, the CFA has held: “When a State decides to become a Member of the
[International Labour] Organization, it accepts the fundamental principles embodied in
the Constitution and the Declaration of Philadelphia, including the principles of freedom
of association.”17 ILO member states are expected to reply to the CFA and to respond to
its recommendations. Nevertheless, if a state has not ratified C. 87, CFA review of that
state’s practices cannot itself lead to an international legal obligation to comply with the
Convention.
If the CFA finds a violation of commitments on freedom of association by a state
that has ratified C. 87, the CFA may refer the case for follow-up to the ILO’s Committee
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.18 This process puts
normative pressure on governments but does not generate a new legal obligation to
comply. Under the ILO Constitution, the obligation to comply with a ratified convention
already exists.19

16

VICTOR-YVES GHEBALI, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION: A CASE STUDY
ON THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. SPECIALISED AGENCIES 77–80 (1989).

17

ILO, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE OF THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE ILO, para. 15
(5th rev. ed. 2006), available at <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/23e2006.pdf>. For the
Declaration of Philadelphia, see note 1 supra.
18

The Committee of Experts is an independent committee (composed of twenty eminent
jurists) that examines reports by governments on the application of ratified conventions,
receives comments from worker and employer nongovernmental organizations, and asks
governments to take needed action to apply ratified conventions fully. For example, in
the late 1970s, the committee reviewed allegations regarding violations of C. 87 by the
Soviet Union. Theodor Meron, Violations of ILO Conventions by the USSR and
Czechoslovakia, 74 AJIL 206 (1980).

19

ILO Const., supra note 1, Art. 19(5)(d).

Legal obligations may emerge from the complaint process provided for in Article
26 of the ILO Constitution. If a party to a convention is alleged to be out of compliance, a
complaint may be lodged by a nongovernmental delegate or by a state that is a party to
that convention. When this procedure is invoked, the ILO Governing Body may refer the
complaint to a commission of inquiry that will investigate, issue findings, and make
recommendations. Since 1919, eleven commissions of inquiry have been established. The
findings and recommendations of the commission can become binding if the defaulting
government accepts the findings, or as a result of an adjudication by the International
Court of Justice if the matter is referred to it.20
The fundamental status of the freedom of association was reinforced in 1998
when the ILO’s annual International Labor Conference adopted the Declaration on

20

Id., Arts. 29(2), 31–34; Francis Maupain, Is the ILO Effective in Upholding Workers’
Rights?: Reflections on the Myanmar Experience, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
85, 99 & n.45 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); Francis Maupain, The Settlement of Disputes
Within the International Labour Office, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 278–79 (1999); Budislav
Vukas, Some Remarks Concerning the Commissions of Inquiry Established Under the
Constitution of the International Labour Organization, in LES NORMES INTERNATIONALES
DU TRAVAIL: UN PATRIMOINE POUR L’AVENIR. MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE NICOLAS
VALTICOS 75, 78–79 (Jean-Claude Javillier & Bernard Gernigon eds., 2004). In principle,
either the complainant government or the respondent government could have recourse to
the ICJ to contest the findings and recommendations of the commission of inquiry. The
ICJ would seem to have jurisdiction because it is specifically provided for in the treaty
establishing the ILO Constitution. How the ICJ might assess its competence remains to
be seen, as the judicial provisions in the ILO Constitution (which hark back to 1919) have
not been used. ILO Const., supra, Art. 29(2); ICJ Statute, Art. 36(1).
One jurisdictional issue is that states do not call an ILO commission of inquiry
into being. Instead, the ILO Governing Body can set up a commission on its own or
following a complaint by a state. ILO Const., supra, Art. 26(1), (4). Thus, commentators
have raised the question whether the intervening role of the Governing Body in setting up
the commission could deprive the ICJ of jurisdiction because no formal dispute between
two states would exist. See, e.g., Anne-Marie La Rosa, Links Between the ILO and the
ICJ: A Less Than Perfect Match, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 119, 126–29 (Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes, Cesare P. R. Romano, & Ruth Mackenzie eds., 2002).

Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.21 In this nonlegally binding declaration, the
conference

[d]eclares that all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the
Organization to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance
with the Constitution [of the ILO], the principles concerning the fundamental
rights which are the subject of those Conventions, namely:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.22

The declaration was carefully drafted to make clear that, under its terms, ILO member
states are not obliging themselves to adhere to the ILO conventions covering the
fundamental labor principles. Moreover, the declaration was not designed to be enforced
through ILO supervisory mechanisms and lacks its own complaint mechanism.

21

The ILO declaration is examined in Brian Langille, The ILO and the New Economy:
Recent Developments,15 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 229 (1999); Anne
Trebilcock, The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: A New
Tool, in THE ILO AND THE SOCIAL CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY: THE GENEVA
LECTURES 105 (Roger Blanpain & Christian Engels eds., 2001).
22
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, para. 2, June 18,
1998, available at <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DeclarationWeb.IndexPage>.

Nevertheless, the declaration can influence states because it both concretizes the concept
of “fundamental principles and rights at work” and recommits member states to the
proposition that ILO membership implies an obligation to respect certain fundamental
principles.23
The ILO declaration is supported by a “follow-up” procedure asking governments
that have not ratified one or more of the fundamental conventions to report annually on
the status of the relevant rights and principles within their borders, noting impediments to
ratification and areas where technical assistance may be required.24 The annual reports by
the U.S. government point out ways that the U.S. Constitution and laws protect freedom
of association. But the U.S. reports have not discussed impediments to ratification of C.
87.
In abstaining from becoming a party to C. 87, the United States has disadvantaged
itself in several ways. The most important may be the reputational cost within the ILO of
not being a party to this core convention.25 Of the eight labor rights conventions

23

The key political momentum for the declaration came from U.S. employers. The
declaration received considerable praise when adopted, but recently has come under
criticism, most notably by Philip Alston. Philip Alston, ‘Core Labour Standards’ and the
Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 457
(2004). Professor Alston argues that the declaration devalues the legal rights in ILO
conventions, that the core standards appear to have been arbitrarily chosen, and that the
vagueness of the declaration will make it convenient for use by the United States to
justify trade sanctions. For a detailed defense of the declaration by one of its intellectual
architects, see Francis Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat: The Real Potential of the
1998 ILO Declaration for the Universal Protection of Workers’ Rights, 16 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 439 (2005). Maupain (who served for eleven years as the ILO legal adviser) claims that
Alston “gets the story upside down.” Id. at 460.
24

The declaration restates the ILO obligation to provide technical assistance to member
governments.

25

The same conclusion has been expressed in policy commentary for many years. See,
e.g., LOUIS B. SOHN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR

identified by the ILO Governing Body as “fundamental,”26 the United States has ratified
only two.27 The negative fallout from the longtime weak U.S. ratification record has been
pointed out in congressional hearings. For example, in 1985 U.S. Secretary of State
George P. Shultz testified that U.S. diplomats can

note that the U.S. Constitution, Bill of Rights, and civil rights statutes ensure
freedom of association, freedom from forced labor, and equality of opportunity
and treatment. These arguments are important, but they do not defuse the charges

ORGANIZATION 22 (26th Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace,
1979) (noting that the United States has the worst ratification record of the eighteen ILO
members that are federal states and asserting that “[i]f the United States wishes to be
influential within the Organization, it must have a strong record of ratification. Only then
would it be assured of being heard when complaining about non-compliance by others.”);
The United States and the International Labor Organization: A Report (May 1956),
reprinted in 310 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 182, 187 (1957) [hereinafter
Johnson Committee Report] (“We can never effectively participate in the ILO if we
continue to become enmeshed in highly formalistic exercises in which we appear to the
world to oppose high principles because of an unwarranted concern about the effect of
ILO on our own legislative processes.”); William G. Rice, Book Review, 2 AM. J. COMP.
L. 404, 405 (1953) (“[T]he United States remains a very coy ratifier of conventions. . . .
The pressure we put on western Europe for greater collective action is somewhat deflated
by our example as a member of the I.L.O. . . .”).
26

The eight conventions are the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining
Convention, 1949 (No. 98); the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); the Abolition
of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); the Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No.
138); the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182); the Equal
Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); and the Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111). ILO, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION’S FUNDAMENTAL CONVENTIONS (2002) (explicating the concept of
fundamental conventions).
27

The two U.S.-ratified conventions are C. 105 and C. 182, both supra note 26. The
United States shares with Myanmar the embarrassing record of having ratified only two
of the eight fundamental conventions.

against us brought about by our refusal to consider ratification of all but a few
ILO conventions . . . .28

Soon afterward, Senator Orrin G. Hatch wrote an op-ed column entitled “Ratify
International Labor Conventions”; in it he stated, among many thoughtful points, that
“our dismal nonratification record undercuts our credibility at the ILO.”29 In 1989 U.S.
Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

Given its tripartite structure and its long-established machinery for
supervising the application of ILO standards, it is not surprising [that] the
International Labor Organization is the United Nations[’] most effective advocate
of human rights.
We are all aware, for example, of the ILO’s courageous support of
Solidarity during the darkest days, and the critical role it has played in Poland’s
historic journey to democracy.
But our ratification record works against our participation in the ILO’s
activities precisely in this critical area. And that is a point . . . . I feel strongly
about.

28

The United States and the International Labor Organization, supra note 9, at 5, 9.
Shultz had served as U.S. secretary of labor from 1969 to 1970 and earlier was a
professor of industrial relations.

29

Orrin G. Hatch, Ratify International Labor Conventions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 10, 1985, at 27.

Although we are a strong advocate of the ILO’s standardsetting activities
and a leading critic of violations of fundamental worker rights, our poor
ratification record does raise questions about the sincerity of our efforts.
Our failure to ratify ILO standards subjects us to criticism that we do not
practice what we preach. And moreover, it also prohibits us from bringing
complaints against other countries for failure to observe standards they have
ratified.30

II. LABOR RIGHTS IN U.S. TRADE POLICY

Failure to ratify fundamental ILO conventions has also undermined the credibility
of the United States in its longtime efforts to use trade policy as a means of promoting
respect for internationally recognized worker rights.31 My experience in 1983–1984 as a
U.S. government negotiator on labor rights (in the Caribbean Basin Initiative) revealed
the indelicacy of asking other governments to guarantee the right to organize and bargain
collectively when the United States itself had not ratified the applicable ILO
conventions.32

30

S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-16, app. at 12, 14 (1989) (Statement of Elizabeth Dole,
secretary of labor). Dole was referring to Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, which
permits a member state to file a complaint that another member state is not effectively
observing an ILO convention that both states have ratified.
31

BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE (2005); Sandra Polaski, Protecting
Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An Analytical Guide, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 13 (2003).
32

Steve Charnovitz, Caribbean Basin Initiative: Setting Labor Standards, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Nov. 1984, at 54.

Although core labor rights have been included as a trade objective in U.S. law for
over three decades, none of those statutory provisions refers to C. 87. Curiously, the only
specific reference to C. 87 in U.S. law concerns labor rights in Cuba rather than in the
United States. That provision states that the United States will observe whether a
transitional government in Cuba makes demonstrated progress toward “allowing the
establishment of independent trade unions as set forth in conventions 87 and 98 of the
International Labor Organization, and allowing the establishment of independent social,
economic, and political associations.”33 Meeting the prescribed requirements could effect
the lifting of the longtime U.S. trade embargo against Cuba.
By contrast, direct references to ILO conventions can be seen in the trade
preference programs of the European Community (EC). In 2005 the Community
approved a new program of generalized tariff preferences for developing countries. It
offers a special incentive arrangement to a country that “has ratified and effectively
implemented” sixteen listed human and labor rights conventions.34 One of those
conventions is C. 87.
In the most recent decade, even as all U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) have
included rules on labor rights, those rules have been kept detached from multilateral labor
conventions. The standoffish attitude in U.S. trade agreements toward ILO conventions
contrasts with the unabashed ardor for intellectual property conventions. For intellectual
property, U.S. trade agreements expressly require adherence to multilateral treaties on
patents, copyrights, and trademarks. For example, the intellectual property chapter of the

33

34

22 U.S.C. §6065(a)(6)(C) (2000). Cuba ratified C. 87 in 1952.

Council Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 of 27 June 1995 Applying a Scheme of
Generalized Tariff Preferences, Art. 9(1) & Annex III, pt. A, 2005 O.J. (L 169) 1.

United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement contains direct references to several
international agreements.35
Following the U.S. midterm elections in 2006, the Democrats (the new majority
party in the U.S. Congress) demanded the insertion of stronger provisions on labor rights
into pending bilateral FTAs with Colombia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea.36
Specifically, congressional leaders insisted that the FTAs be revised to include
commitments by governments regarding fundamental labor rights. The most
straightforward approach would have been for both FTA parties to pledge adherence to
fundamental ILO conventions. But that approach was blocked for the United States by
the absence of U.S. ratification of most of these conventions, including C. 87.37
The work-around engineered by congressional leaders and the Bush
administration was to link the new FTA commitments not to ILO treaties but, rather, to
the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.38 Once this

35

United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Art. 16.1, Jan. 15, 2003, available at
<http://www.ustr.gov>.

36

See Rossella Brevetti, Administration, Democrats Reach Deal on Labor Standards in
Free Trade Pacts, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A–15 (May 11, 2007).

37

The U.S. business community opposed having the FTAs directly reference ILO
conventions. Rossella Brevetti & Jane Winebrenner, NAM Rejects Plan for ILO
Standards for United States in Free Trade Pacts, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) at A–
7 (Apr. 20, 2007). (“NAM” is the National Association of Manufacturers.) In early 2007,
the U.S. Council for International Business stated: “Since incorporating these [ILO]
conventions into U.S. trade agreements would have the same effect as ratification,
extensive revisions to U.S. state and federal labor laws would be necessary. The result
would be radical changes to U.S. law in a manner that precluded debate or amendment in
Congress or in state legislatures.” United States Council for International Business, U.S.
Ratification of ILO Core Labor Standards at 2 (n.d.).

38

Editorial, Deal or No Deal, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2007, at A20. The editorial
summarizes the new deal and explains: “This means the AFL-CIO will not be able to

plan was agreed to in Washington, U.S. trade negotiators made an offer to each foreign
counterpart that could not be easily refused: accept a set of treaty changes demanded by
the United States on labor, environment, and other issues, or take a chance that the
pending FTA would never be approved by Congress. Not surprisingly, all four countries
accepted the offer and agreed to revisions in their FTA text.
As seen in the U.S.-Peru FTA, the new template on “fundamental labor rights”
commits each party to “adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations” the “rights”
stated in the ILO declaration.39 In addition, the FTA mandates that “[n]either Party shall
waive or otherwise derogate from . . . its statutes or regulations” implementing those
rights where the waiver or derogation would be inconsistent with a “fundamental right.”40
To be a violation of these provisions, the challenged measure has to be “affecting trade or
investment between the Parties.”41 Failure to implement these provisions is subject to
state-to-state dispute settlement by an independent panel. An uncorrected violation can
lead to a monetary fine or, if unpaid, to a trade sanction.42

rewrite U.S. labor law by the back door and it should entail no new obligations for U.S.
business.”
39

See, e.g., United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Art. 17.2(1), Apr. 12, 2006,
with Protocol of Amendment, June 25, 2007, available at <http://www.ustr.gov>. For the
United States, the term “statutes and regulations” is restricted to those at the central level
of government. Id., Art. 17.8. The same template is included in the FTAs with Colombia,
Panama, and South Korea.
40

Id., Art. 17.2(2).

41

Id., Art. 17.2 & n.1.

42

Id., Art. 21.16; see Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Peru TPA Facts, Real
Results on Labor Rights at 1 (July 2007), available at
<http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Section_Index.html>
(“Available remedies are fines and trade sanctions, based on amount of trade injury.”).

The Peru-U.S. FTA contains a footnote stating that the obligations on
fundamental labor rights “as they relate to the ILO, refer only to the ILO Declaration.”43
This footnote was apparently added to clarify that the parties did not intend to incorporate
by reference the rules of the fundamental ILO conventions, such as C. 87. Nevertheless,
in seeking congressional votes for this FTA, leaders of the House Ways and Means
Committee have been quick to describe it as a commitment to “adopt and enforce the five
basic international labor standards.”44 The term “international labor standards” is
typically used to refer to ILO conventions and recommendations.45 Moreover, literature
issued by the committee also asserted that the FTA would fully enforce “[b]asic labor
standards as defined by the ILO.”46
These new disciplines on labor depart from all previous trade agreements. For the
first time, parties have agreed to adhere to a minimum level of fundamental worker
“rights” within their territories. Opinions differ on whether a trade agreement is an
appropriate instrument for mutual obligations of this type.47 In my view, while a trade

43

United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 39, Art. 17.2(1) & n.2.

44

Letter from Charles B. Rangel, chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, and
Sander M. Levin, chairman, Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, to
Democratic Colleagues (Sept. 18, 2007) (on file with author).

45

See Nicolas Valticos, International Labour Standards and Human Rights:
Approaching the Year 2000, 137 INT’L LAB. REV. 135, 135 & n.2 (1998).
46

House Comm. on Ways and Means, Peru FTA Contains Unprecedented Tools to
Enforce Strong New Labor and Environmental Standards (n.d.), available at
<http://waysandmeans.house.gov/search.asp> (search “Peru FTA enforcement labor
standards”; then follow
“C:\Documents_and_Settings\carrieb\My_Documents\PERU_ENFORCEMENT_ONE_P
AGER.wpd” hyperlink).
47

See Hard Labour for Trade Negotiators: Trade Deals Are Not the Place to Write
Employment Law, FIN. TIMES (London), May 18, 2007, at 14; Chicago Council on Global

agreement may be an appropriate instrument, it is surely not the optimal instrument. The
ostensible advantage of using a trade agreement to make labor commitments lies in the
availability of enforcement through trade sanctions.48 By contrast, labor treaties do not
enable the use of trade sanctions for enforcement.
By the end of 2007, only one of the four pending FTAs with labor rights
obligations had been approved by the U.S. Congress, the U.S.-Peru Agreement.49 The
Peruvian Congress had already approved the revised FTA.50
Approval of the FTA with Peru by the U.S. Congress strengthens the international
law commitment of the United States on worker rights. As seen above, in the ILO
declaration of 1998, governments acknowledged that ILO membership itself conveys an
obligation “to promote and to realize, in good faith . . . the principles concerning the
fundamental rights” that are the subject of fundamental ILO conventions, including
“freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective

Affairs, Poll Finds International Publics Strongly Favor Labor and Environmental
Standards in Trade Agreements (Mar. 2007), available at
<http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/media_press_room_detail.php?press_release_id=59>
(noting strong support in developing and developed countries for minimum labor
standards in trade agreements).
48

Kimberly Ann Elliott, The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Standards, INT’L
ECON. POL’Y BRIEFS, July 2000, at 6–7, available at
<http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb00-6.pdf>.
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Rossella Brevetti, House Approves Peru FTA Measure; Majority of Democrats Vote
Against Bill, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A–12 (Nov. 9, 2007); Steven R.
Weisman, Senate Votes to Approve Trade Deal with Peru, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, at
C3; George W. Bush, Remarks with President Alan Garcia Perez of Peru on Signing the
United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, 43 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1588 (Dec. 17, 2007); United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 110-138, 121 Stat. 1455 (2007) (to be codified at 19
U.S.C. §3805 note). The U.S.-Peru FTA is not yet in force.
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Lucien O. Chauvin, Peru Congress OKs Amendments to Free Trade Pact with United
States, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) at A–3 (June 29, 2007).

bargaining.”51 Yet in ratifying the U.S.-Peru FTA, the United States goes beyond the
declaration, which was carefully drafted to key off the word “principles.” Under the FTA,
the United States gains a legal obligation to “adopt and maintain” the prescribed “rights,”
and not to waive or otherwise derogate from them.52
The implications of this new obligation were noted by Senator Hatch during the
Senate debate on the U.S.-Peru FTA in December 2007. According to Senator Hatch:

Several provisions of the labor chapter of the U.S.-Peru trade agreement create an
unacceptable risk that the United States will be required to change important
provisions of U.S. Federal and state labor law or be subject to trade sanctions. . . .
....
The Peru FTA does not provide any definition of these fundamental rights,
leaving the interpretation of what constitutes “freedom of association” or
“collective bargaining” to a dispute settlement panel appointed by the U.S. and
Peruvian Governments.
Given the agreement’s reference to the ILO declaration, it is widely
expected that such a dispute settlement panel would in fact look at and rely at
least partially on the standards of the relevant ILO core conventions associated

51

52

See text at note 22 supra.

See text at notes 39–40 supra. The FTA labor provision is a classic incomplete
contract. The intentional vagueness of this new labor commitment would put an FTA
dispute panel in a quandary of not knowing how to delineate the substantive content of
the freedom of association “right” and whether to rely upon the relevant ILO case law.

with these rights, much as the ILO does each year in its followup reports required
by the ILO declaration.53

III. U.S. PRACTICE ON ILO CONVENTIONS

While making a legal commitment to Peru on labor rights certainly has
repercussions beyond Peru,54 I find it odd, nonetheless, that a major new U.S.
commitment on freedom of association is to be made only to Peru, rather than to all ILO
members.55 As a supporter of freedom of association, I believe that the Peru FTA moves
the United States in the right direction. Far better, however, would be for the United
States to consider ratifying the multilateral treaty on freedom of association.
To be sure, the United States is already a party to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which states that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.”56 Yet the international community recognizes C. 87 as the
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Although the commitment is bilateral to Peru, all of the U.S. labor obligations will be
performed inside the United States. Whatever benefit this promised U.S. behavior confers
outside the United States will not be enjoyed exclusively by Peru but, rather, will redound
upon all countries.
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This is not to imply that enhancing legal protection for American workers was the
object of the trade negotiation. Almost all of the domestic debate in 2007 about the new
labor provision in the Peru-U.S. FTA concerned how to broaden Peru’s obligations to the
United States on fundamental labor rights. Little attention was given to the new labor
obligations of the United States.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 22, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC.
DOC. NO. 95–F (1978), 999 UNTS 171. The United States is also a party to the Racial
Discrimination Convention, which commits parties to guarantee the right of everyone to

most authoritative law on freedom of association. In comparison to the Covenant, the
ILO instruments make a more robust complaint mechanism available to labor unions and
employers.57
The skittishness of the Senate toward the ILO may be an atavistic impulse going
back to 1919 when the Senate considered, but failed to consent to, the Treaty of
Versailles. One of the infamous treaty reservations adopted at that time stated that the
United States was withholding its consent to the ILO-related part of the Treaty until
Congress provided by law for U.S. participation.58 In 1934 both the Senate and the House
acted to authorize U.S. participation in the ILO.59
Even as C. 87 was being negotiated in 1948, doubts were expressed in the United
States as to whether the Convention would be approved by the Senate and, if so, whether
changes in U.S. law would be needed.60 In the same year that the ILO adopted C. 87, a

equality before the law in the enjoyment of listed rights, including the “right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and association.” International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. 5(d)(ix), Dec. 21, 1965, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 95–
C (1978), 660 UNTS 195.
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Both the Covenant and the Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 56, have
optional protocols providing a process to receive communications from an individual
alleging a violation of rights under the treaty. The United States, however, has not joined
either optional protocol. In the ILO, no analogous optional protocols exist because labor
unions may bring complaints under the regular supervisory mechanism.
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This reservation was approved by the Senate in both 1919 and 1920. George A. Finch,
The Treaty of Peace with Germany in the United States Senate, 14 AJIL 155, 181, 195
(1920).
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S.J. Res. 43, 73d Cong., 48 Stat. 1182 (1934) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §271). Even
before the United States joined the ILO, the Hoover administration had sent a tripartite
delegation of observers to the annual ILO Conference. EDWARD C. LORENZ, DEFINING
GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS POLICY 97
(2001).
60
Lawrence E. Davies, Broad Guarantees in ILO Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1948,
at 4.

UN conference drafted a multilateral trade treaty known as the Charter of the
International Trade Organization (ITO). Isolationist groups criticized both treaties. In
April 1949, for example, the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) passed
resolutions against them both.61 The U.S. business community was especially worried
about the potential influence of ILO conventions on U.S. labor and employment law, and,
in the early 1950s during the Bricker Amendment controversy, ILO conventions became
one target of the debate.62 In her newspaper column in February 1953, Eleanor Roosevelt
stated of Senator John Bricker:
The Senator attacks most violently the U.N. specialized agency called the
International Labor Organization, saying it aims “to become economic overseer of
all humanity.” This is amusing in view of the fact that in this organization[,]
labor, employers and government are all represented, and they go over their
agreements with great care. But any conclusion the ILO draws can only be put
into effect in a nation that ratifies them, and we have ratified remarkably few of
these conventions.63
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Bess Furman, 2 Agencies of U.N. Assailed by D.A.R.; U.S. Participation in ITO and
ILO ‘Freedom to Organize’ Convention Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1949, at 27. The
United States decided not to participate in the ITO, and that organization never came into
being.
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See, e.g., Oral History Interview with Philip Kaiser (June 8 & 11, 1987), available at
<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/kaiserp.htm>. In Senate hearings on the Bricker
Amendment, three business representatives spoke against ratification of ILO conventions
and particularly against C. 87. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 9, at 54. U.S.
employers perceived the ILO’s approval of C. 87 in 1948 as an attempt to do an end run
around the Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act passed over President
Truman’s veto in 1947. JOHN BRUCE TIPTON, PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 86 (1959).
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Eleanor Roosevelt, My Day, Feb. 21, 1953, available at
<http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/myday/displaydoc.cfm?_y=1953&_f=md002464>.

A half century later, the United States has ratified just 14 of the 188 ILO Conventions.
Over the years, the United States relationship with the ILO has had its ups and
downs. The first annual ILO Conference of 1919 was held in Washington, D.C., but the
U.S. government did not send an official delegation.64 The legislation that authorized the
ILO membership of the United States in 1934 had been promoted by Secretary of Labor
Frances Perkins and by academics and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that
envisioned ILO treaties as a potential constitutional justification for federal employment
law in the era before the Supreme Court upheld federal fair labor standards.65 The United
States began ratifying ILO conventions in 1938 when the Senate consented to five
maritime conventions.66 Thereafter, the U.S. ratification rate slowed—with only one
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Nevertheless, there was considerable participation by Americans. For example,
Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson was the 1919 conference chairman and Manley O.
Hudson served as the legal adviser. Ursula P. Hubbard, The Cooperation of the United
States with the League of Nations and with the International Labour Organization, INT’L
CONCILIATION, NO. 274, Nov. 1931, at 136.
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See Edward C. Lorenz, The Search for Constitutional Protection of Labor Standards,
1924–1941: From Interstate Compacts to International Treaties, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
569, 587–594 (2000). The idea of using labor treaties in this manner appears to have
originated with Joseph P. Chamberlain of Columbia University. See Joseph P.
Chamberlain, Migratory Bird Treaty Decision and Its Relation to Labor Treaties, 10 AM.
LAB. LEGIS. REV. 133 (1920). The Supreme Court decision United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act and overruled the prior case law in
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
66

President Franklin D. Roosevelt began submitting ILO conventions to the Senate in
1936. The Officers’ Competency Certificates Convention, 1936 (No. 53), the Holidays
with Pay (Sea) Convention, 1936 (No. 54), the Shipowners’ Liability (Sick and Injured
Seamen) Convention, 1936 (No. 55), the Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention,
1936 (No. 57), and the Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1936 (No. 58) were
all ratified by the United States in 1938. ILO, Ratifications (Jan. 8, 2008), available at
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm>.When Senator Elbert D. Thomas
proposed the adoption of the five ILO conventions in 1938, he told the Senate that
“American standards are so much higher than any of these conventions recommend,” and

ratification in the 1940s, one in the 1950s, and none in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1980s.67
In the early 1970s, all of the U.S. participants in the ILO—the workers, employers, and
the federal government—became increasingly dissatisfied with political developments in
the organization.68 This situation led to U.S. withdrawal in 1977. After some practices of
the ILO were improved, the United States rejoined in 1980.69
Owing to the efforts of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the Senate began to
break the logjam in ILO conventions in 1988 when it consented to the Tripartite
Consultation Convention, 1976 (No. 144) and the Merchant Shipping (Minimum
Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 147). During the 1990s, the Senate consented to four
ILO conventions—the Labour Statistics Convention, 1985 (No. 160), approved in 1990;
the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), approved in 1991; the
Labour Administration Convention, 1978 (No. 150), approved in 1994; and the Worst
Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), approved in 1999. In 2000 the
Safety and Health in Mines Convention, 1995 (No. 176) received consent.70 Since the

that with the conventions universally adopted, “our own ships may compete on a better
level with the ships of other countries which have lower standards.” 83 CONG. REC.
9023–24 (1938). Two additional ILO conventions sent to the Senate in 1938 were not
ratified.
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The Final Articles Revision Convention, 1946 (No. 80) was ratified by the United
States in 1948. The Certification of Able Seamen Convention, 1946 (No. 74) was ratified
by the United States in 1953. ILO, supra note 66.
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Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States’ Participation in the ILO: Redefining the Role,
11 COMP. LAB. L. 48, 70–72 (1989) (discussing the grounds for U.S. withdrawal and
reentry).
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ILO, supra note 66.

retirement of Senator Moynihan in 2000, the Senate has not considered any more ILO
conventions.
Senator Moynihan moved ahead on all seven of the ILO conventions that he
shepherded through the Senate only after each one received the tripartite support of the
executive branch, labor, and employers. The forum used to weave together that support
was the President’s Committee on the International Labor Organization, which was
established by executive order in 1980 and reauthorized regularly since then.71 The
committee is chaired by the secretary of labor and includes as members the secretary of
state, the secretary of commerce, the assistant to the president for national security
affairs, the assistant to the president for economic policy, and one representative each
from organized labor and the business community.72 In practice, organized labor has been
represented by the AFL-CIO, and the business community by the U.S. Council for
International Business. To aid it in its work, the committee has established the Tripartite
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Exec. Order No. 12,216, 45 Fed. Reg. 41,619 (June 20, 1980), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.
§271 note (2000) [hereinafter President’s Committee on the ILO].
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The absence of and need for “an advisory policy committee composed of government,
employer and worker representatives” had been pointed out by the Johnson Committee in
1956. Johnson Committee Report, supra note 25, at 184. The Johnson Committee was
appointed by the U.S. Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor to conduct an
independent review of U.S. policies toward the ILO. (The committee was headed by
Joseph E. Johnson, the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.)
The committee’s recommendations for better coordinating machinery were not acted
upon until 1980, and this long delay undermined U.S. policy coherence. More than two
decades before the Johnson Committee Report, Manley O. Hudson had advised that U.S.
opportunities in the ILO “will be grasped, however, only if the various departments of the
government are organized to that end and if the Government of the United States shows
itself, from the beginning, determined to make its membership more than a matter of
routine.” Manley O. Hudson, The Membership of the United States in the International
Labor Organization, 28 AJIL 669, 682 (1934).

Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards, composed of legal advisers from the
member entities.
Gaining Senate approval of additional fundamental ILO conventions will be
difficult.73 Those conventions trigger the same concerns about treaty supremacy that have
sometimes ensnared human rights treaties in the United States.74 As with treaties
generally, ILO conventions have the potential to be directly applied by U.S. courts. In the
1951 case Warren v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the United States, as
owner of a merchant ship, was liable to a seaman for injuries he had suffered on shore
leave.75 In deciding the case, the Court appeared to accept the applicable ILO convention
as U.S. law that could create rights for individuals. The reluctance to consider ratifying
additional fundamental ILO conventions can also be attributed to the existence of
detailed, contentious federal labor law regulating the same issues covered by the ILO
conventions.
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Besides C. 87, the other fundamental ILO convention now before the U.S. Senate is
the Discrimination Convention (No. 111). It was transmitted to the Senate by President
William J. Clinton in May 1998. Nearly ten years later, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has yet to hold a public hearing on C. 111.
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As Professor Henkin noted in 1995, U.S. ratification of human rights conventions has
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Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951). The central issue in the case was the
meaning of the Shipowners’ Liability Convention (No. 55) in U.S. law. On Warren and
the ILO, see VIRGINIA A. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND NATIONAL
LAW 77–82 (1982); Nicolas Valticos, The International Labour Organization, in THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS: PAPERS OF A CONFERENCE OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONFERENCE 134, 141–42 (Stephen M. Schwebel ed., 1971).

In past Senate approvals of ILO conventions, the resolutions of ratification have
sometimes included a specially crafted understanding or declaration. For the Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention (No. 105), the Senate adopted an understanding that the
conclusions and practice of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations “are not legally binding on the United States and
have no force and effect on courts in the United States.”76 For the Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention (No. 182), the Senate adopted an understanding that Article 3(d) of
the Convention77 does not encompass situations in which children are employed by a
parent, and does not change U.S. agricultural employment law or the Fair Labor
Standards Act.78 Neither of these Senate resolutions, for C. 105 or C. 182, included a
declaration characterizing the Convention as non-self-executing. But in 2000, when the
Senate approved the Safety and Health in Mines Convention (No. 176), the resolution
contained a declaration that “[t]he United States understands that the Convention is not
self-executing.”79 The United States has not sought to attach a reservation to an ILO
convention. In ILO practice, treaty reservations are not accepted.80
When it consented to the ILO Convention on Tripartite Consultation to Promote
the Implementation of International Labour Standards (No. 144), the Senate’s resolution
of advice and consent to ratification memorialized ground rules for U.S. implementation
76

137 CONG. REC. S10,790–91 (daily ed. May 14, 1991).

77

Article 3(d) of ILO Convention No. 182, supra note 26, concerns work that, “by its
nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety
or morals of children.”
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145 CONG. REC. S28,858 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1999).
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146 CONG. REC. S18,766 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2000).

of the Convention,81 including decisions to submit ILO conventions to the U.S. Senate.
Those ground rules had been adopted in 1985 by the President’s Committee on the ILO.
The Senate resolution on C. 144 states:
There is agreement by the U.S. Government agencies concerned, the AFLCIO, and the U.S. Council for International Business, that each ILO convention
will be examined on its merits on a tripartite basis; that if there are any differences
between the convention and Federal law and practice, these will be dealt with in
the normal legislative process; and that there is no intention to change State law
and practice by Federal action through ratification of ILO conventions, and the
examination will include possible conflicts between Federal and State law that
would be caused by such ratification.82

In discussing this resolution, which he had helped craft, Senator Moynihan explained:

Under the ground rules, only conventions that are in conformance with U.S. law
and practice, or conventions for which implementing legislation has been
introduced to reconcile the difference between U.S. law and practice and a
convention’s requirements, are appropriate for Senate action. In other words,
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Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations:
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 686 (2006).
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regarding the ratification of ILO conventions. In my view, these provisions do not apply
to C. 87 because it has already been submitted to the U.S. Senate.
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134 CONG. REC. S473, 474 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1988).

consideration of other conventions that do not fit in these two categories would
violate the ground rules and would be presumptively inappropriate for Senate
action.83

The central principle of the ground rules seems to be that ILO conventions, as treaties
under the U.S. Constitution, will not be used as a back door for changing federal and state
labor law.
One can observe various actors putting their own spin on the ground rules.
According to the U.S. Department of Labor, those rules state that “no ILO convention
will be ratified unless or until U.S. law and practice, at both the federal and state levels, is
in full conformity with its provisions.”84 According to the U.S. Council for International
Business, the rules dictate that “no ILO convention will be forwarded to the U.S. Senate
for ratification if ratification would require any change in U.S. federal or state laws.”85
In my view, the ground rules do not assert that when U.S. law is inconsistent with
an ILO convention, ratification of that convention is off the table. Rather, they suggest
that when such an inconsistency exists, Congress must change U.S. law (or begin doing
so) before the convention will be acted upon by the Senate. In assessing whether U.S.
labor standards should be brought up to the international level, each ILO convention is to
“be examined on its merits.”
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U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, International Labor
Organization (ILO), available at <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/oir/ILO.htm>.
85
U.S. Council for International Business, Issue Analysis: U.S. Ratification of ILO Core
Labor Standards 4 (Apr. 2007), available at
<http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=1926>.

IV. COMPATIBILITY OF C. 87 WITH EXISTING U.S. LAW

The Tripartite Advisory Panel has not examined whether U.S. law and practice
meets the standards in the ILO Convention on Freedom of Association. Indeed, to my
knowledge, there has never been a tripartite or independent study comparing C. 87 to
U.S. law. In view of the complexity of U.S. labor law and administrative practice, the
variation among states, and the continuing elaboration of C. 87 by CFA decisions, such
an exercise would be a major effort. Nevertheless, a comprehensive analysis ought to be
undertaken to see what changes in U.S. federal and state law would be needed to comply
with C. 87.
Two studies in the public domain address the consistency of U.S. law with C. 87.
In 1980 the Office of the Solicitor of the U.S. Department of Labor concluded that
“Convention No. 87 may be unequivocally ratified by the United States without entailing
any undertaking to enact legislation or to modify existing law.”86 That study took note of
concerns that “creative judicial construction” of the Convention might nullify domestic
legislation, and therefore suggested a possible remedy of crafting a special declaration or
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U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 9, at 49. The briefing paper was based on a 1976 study
that was not published. The briefing paper and the study focused on the potential
inconsistencies between the Convention, on the one hand, and the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1949, 29 U.S.C. §89 (Landrum-Griffin Act), and the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §141 (Taft-Hartley Act), on the
other. Back in 1971, a U.S. interagency report (overseen by the U.S. Department of
Labor) had urged ratification of C. 87. WALTER GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION: AN AMERICAN VIEW 116–17, & 318 n.14 (1981).

understanding to avoid that result.87 In 1984 Edward Potter, a legal counselor to the U.S.
employer delegation to the ILO, wrote a lengthy study published by the Labor Policy
Association.88 Potter concluded that if C. 87 were ratified and, as a treaty, superseded
contrary requirements in U.S. legislation, the Convention would affect or alter U.S. labor
law in many significant ways.89 Another section of his study considered the possibility of
ratifying C. 87 and C. 98 on a non-self-executing basis, but concluded that without U.S.
implementing legislation, the U.S. obligations under those two conventions would be
breached.
Periodically, the U.S. government is asked by the ILO to report on the status of C.
87 in the United States.90 The most recent report came in 1994 when the government
stated “that although no recent in-depth tripartite analysis has been performed regarding
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For example, Potter found that ratification would “[a]lter a fundamental principle of
U.S. labor law, which makes union rights derivative from those of employees, by
subordinating employee rights to those of labor organizations.” Id. at 44. In a recent
article, Potter remarked that his 1984 study remains valid and then stated:
Unqualified ratification of one or both of those conventions [Nos. 87 and 98]
would redirect US labour policy significantly. To mention just two [examples]:
the conventions would broaden the right to strike but give representation rights to
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Landrum-Griffin Act, but would remove limits on disaffiliations of local unions
from international unions.
Edward Potter, The Growing Importance of the International Labour Organization: The
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371 (John D. R. Craig & S. Michael Lynk eds., 2006).
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The requirement for reporting in the general survey is found in the Constitution of the
ILO, supra note 1, Art. 19(5)(e).

this Convention, federal legislation appears to be in general conformity with the
Convention: no additional measure is envisaged, including as regards ratification of the
Convention.”91 The first annual report (2000) by the U.S. government under the 1998
ILO declaration was more nuanced and revealing. That report notes the elaborate system
of substantive labor law, and then states: “Nonetheless, the United States acknowledges
that there are aspects of this system that fail to fully protect the rights to organize and
bargain collectively of all employees in all circumstances.”92
As noted above, even though it is not a party to C. 87 and C. 98, the United States
is subject to complaints brought against it in the CFA. In the most recent decision
involving the United States, the CFA ruled in 2007 that certain provisions in North
Carolina law ban trade unions in the public sector from engaging in collective bargaining,
and that these provisions are contrary to both C. 87 and C. 98.93
Other analysts agree that U.S. labor law and practice can be inconsistent with C.
87. For example, Janice R. Bellace has written that the United States could not easily
ratify C. 87 because “American law permits major gaps in protection [of workers] to
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States, available at
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Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), supported by Public Services
International (PSI), Report No. 344, Case No. 2460, para. 991, available at
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/caseframeE.htm>. Close observers of CFA
jurisprudence perceive a harsher tone in this decision, as compared to previous U.S.
cases, in applying C. 87 requirements to the United States.

exist.”94 James A. Gross has written that the U.S. government “is not ensuring within its
territory the exercise of the right of freedom of association at the workplace.”95 My own
opinion is that the Truman administration’s statement to the U.S. Senate in 1949 quoted
above,96 suggesting that ratification of C. 87 would not require any changes in U.S. law,
would not be correct today.
Although I have heard it said that U.S. ratification of C. 87 could actually
undermine employee rights in the United States, I have never seen that argument
expounded in an intelligible way. Any interpretation of C. 87 should be guided by the
provision of the ILO Constitution that states:

In no case shall the adoption of any Convention or Recommendation by the
Conference, or the ratification of any Convention by any Member, be deemed to
affect any law, award, custom or agreement which ensures more favourable
conditions to the workers concerned than those provided for in the Convention or
Recommendation.97
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ILO Const., supra note 1, Art. 19(8). This provision was proposed by the United States
in 1919. David Hunter Miller, Some Results of the Labor Clauses of the Treaty of
Versailles, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 133, 153 (1921).

V. MOVING AHEAD ON C. 87

The most salient feature of the U.S. domestic “debate” about ratification of C. 87
is that no ongoing debate occurs. The notion that the United States would actually ratify
this basic human rights convention is so unimaginable that it is hardly ever discussed. As
noted above, the president’s committee and the Tripartite Advisory Panel have never put
C. 87 on their agenda. Furthermore, U.S. human rights groups and labor unions have not
campaigned for U.S. ratification.98 The U.S. business community would be strongly
opposed, and appears to take the position that ratification of an ILO convention would be
inappropriate unless that instrument conforms to U.S. law.
U.S. acceptance of international agreements in many other fields of law differs, in
that elected officials, NGOs, and the business community seek the adoption of federal
implementing legislation concomitantly with Senate approval of the new instrument. The
most innovative process is applied to trade agreements, whose approval is voted by the
full Congress, not just the Senate, and is given in the same legislative vehicle that enacts
the implementing legislation. For example, approval of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) was accomplished through legislation that amended U.S. sanitary
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and phytosanitary laws so as to conform them to the NAFTA. Likewise, the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) was effectuated by legislation that
conformed U.S. intellectual property law to the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Moreover, all trade agreements approved by
Congress must receive implementing legislation to alter tariffs and customs treatment.
Such legislation includes a provision stating that in the event of a conflict between the
trade agreement and U.S. law, the latter will prevail.99
The availability of bicameral fast-track procedures to approve new trade
agreements100 has enabled the strengthening of international trade law and U.S.
participation in it. Because Congress has not provided for such procedures for U.S. treaty
making in other fields, the United States can more easily make new international labor
commitments through a trade agreement than through an ILO convention (or a bilateral
labor treaty). Similarly, the labor law commitments the United States seeks from other
countries are legalized more easily through a trade agreement than through a labor
agreement.
Whether the United States should ratify C. 87 and, if necessary, raise U.S. law to
international standards should be decided with reference to U.S. objectives in both
foreign and domestic policy. When he testified to Congress about ILO conventions in
1985, Secretary of State Shultz put forward the proposition, “looking at it from the
standpoint of our foreign policy objectives and our effectiveness for work within the ILO
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organization, that we ought to be willing to look at these conventions on their merits.”101
Unfortunately, the U.S. Senate has failed to examine C. 87 on its merits. Indeed, since
1949 the Committee on Foreign Relations has never found time to hold a public hearing
on the Freedom of Association Convention.
How should the United States move forward? As of the end of 2007, President
George W. Bush had not called a meeting of the President’s Committee on the ILO
during his incumbency. The next president should convene this committee and ask it to
undertake an objective examination of any inconsistencies between U.S. law and C. 87.
In doing so, the president should expand the committee’s membership to include a
representative of state governments.
The committee should also consider whether refinements are needed in the 1985
ground rules to take into account the impracticality of assuring, before ratification is
undertaken, that no U.S. law or practice violates the ILO convention under review. The
current approach is especially unsuitable when complaint mechanisms apply to the
convention, as with C. 87, resulting in the constant evolution of the case law. To
generalize the point: in complex, rule-based multilateral regimes, breaches of a treaty are
to be expected even by nations that observe almost all of their obligations almost all of
the time.102
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Note that the International Labour Office recognizes that some countries “ratify ILO
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The president’s committee might usefully reflect on the example of U.S.
participation in the WTO, where the dispute settlement system regularly finds the United
States noncompliant with the WTO treaty.103 Such adjudications then trigger efforts in
Congress or federal agencies to bring the United States into compliance. This dialectical
process has its tensions, but its wisdom can be seen by imagining the alternative scenario:
the United States waits (forever) to join the WTO until it can be sure that no domestic
law or practice violates WTO law. The lesson from the WTO experience is that achieving
and sustaining national compliance must be a continuous process.
If a tripartite review of C. 87 identifies specific statutory provisions that fall
below the international standard, Congress should examine whether legal reforms should
be adopted.104 The U.S. labor market is not isolated from those of other countries, and
can potentially gain if U.S. law is adapted to reflect more effective foreign practices in
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achieving freedom of association. Congress ought not to start on the assumption that the
American economy is locked into the U.S. labor laws enacted over sixty years ago.105
Ultimately, persuading the Senate to take up C. 87 will require leadership within
that body.106 To get the gears moving, human rights NGOs and U.S. labor unions might
consider establishing a “Sixty Years Is Enough” campaign to underline how the Senate
has failed in its duty to consider C. 87. Although many sitting senators portray
themselves as paladins of the American worker, none seems to show much interest in the
Freedom of Association Convention. By way of counterexample, the heroic
determination of Senator William Proxmire comes to mind. Proxmire was so dedicated to
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Moreover, Senate consent to the Convention will require a two-thirds vote, which
would seem difficult to obtain if the business community opposes that action. Reportedly,
there is also concern among American sovereigntists because the ILO Constitution
provides for possible referrals to the ICJ. See ILO Const., supra note 1, Arts. 29(2),
37(1); see also note 20 supra. No such referrals to the ICJ have occurred, however, and
the possibility that a state could be brought to the ICJ against its will seems remote. If a
state were the object of an Article 29 commission of inquiry and were found to be in
violation of an ILO convention it had ratified, the state could decide against referring the
matter to the ICJ. The other provision for ICJ referral is Article 37(1) of the ILO
Constitution, which states that “[a]ny question or dispute relating to the interpretation of
this Constitution or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the Members . . . shall
be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice.” Yet by its terms, Article
37(1) seems to be about questions of interpretation, rather than questions of
implementation by a particular state. Moreover, Article 37(1) is not preconditioned on
whether a member state has ratified a particular ILO convention. Hence, ratification of C.
87 does not trigger a new possibility of an ICJ referral.

U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention that he delivered a speech on the Senate
floor every day from 1967 until the resolution of ratification was adopted in 1986.107
A question for 2008 and beyond is whether there are any U.S. senators who care
enough about the ILO and worker rights to champion U.S. ratification of the Convention
on Freedom of Association.
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